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Spatial congruity effects have often been interpreted as evidence for metaphorical
thinking, but an alternative account based on polarity correspondence (a.k.a.
markedness) has challenged this view. Here we compared metaphor- and polarity-
correspondence-based explanations for spatial congruity effects, using musical pitch
as a testbed. In one experiment, English speakers classified high- and low-frequency
pitches as “high” and “low,” or as “front” and “back,” to determine whether space-pitch
congruity effects could be elicited by any marked spatial continuum. Although both pairs
of terms describe bipolar spatial continuums, we found congruity effects only for high/low
judgments, indicating that markedness is not sufficient to produce space-pitch congruity
effects. A second experiment confirmed that there were no space-pitch congruity effects
for another pair of terms that have clear markedness (big/small), but which do not denote
spatial height. By contrast, this experiment showed congruity effects for words that
cued an appropriate vertical spatial schema (tall/short), even though these words are
not used conventionally in English to describe pitches, ruling out explanations for the
observed pattern of results based on verbal polysemy. Together, results suggest that
space-pitch congruity effects reveal metaphorical uses of spatial schemas, not polarity
correspondence effects.
Keywords: conceptual metaphor, markedness, musical pitch, polarity correspondence, space
INTRODUCTION
Are high hopes somewhere in the air? Or what about rising prices? And where exactly are low
numbers? Spatial metaphors like these are very common in language. According to theories
of metaphorical mental representation (e.g., Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), people not only talk
metaphorically but also think metaphorically, activating mental representations of space to scaffold
their thinking in a variety of non-spatial domains. Whereas initial arguments in favor of metaphor
theory were based on linguistic data, numerous psychological experiments have now shown that
spatial representations contribute to people’s understanding of non-spatial domains like time
(Torralbo et al., 2006), social dominance (Schubert, 2005), emotional valence (Meier and Robinson,
2004), similarity (Casasanto, 2008), and musical pitch (Rusconi et al., 2006; for reviews, see Landau
et al., 2010; Casasanto and Bottini, 2014a).
Many of these psychological studies base their findings on binary stimulus-stimulus or stimulus-
response compatibility tasks. In one experiment, for instance, participants were asked to classify
dimensions in a metaphoric target domain (e.g., valence: judge the positive or negative valence of
a word), while, at the same time aspects of the spatial source domain were varied (i.e., location of
the stimuli: top or bottom of the screen). Consistent with “GOOD is UP” metaphors in language,
people were faster to evaluate positive words when they appeared in a high spatial location compared
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to a low location (and vice versa for negatively-valenced words;
Meier and Robinson, 2004). Similarly, participants made faster
judgments about social power when words for powerful people
were at the top of a display and powerless people at the bottom
(e.g., “king” above “slave,” Schubert, 2005), and not vice versa.
These metaphor congruity effects, with faster performance for
congruent compared to incongruent trials, have been taken as
evidence that metaphoric target domains automatically activate
congruent spatial information, supporting Lakoff and Johnson’s
(1980) conceptual metaphor theory.
On an alternative account, however, it has been argued
that spatial congruity effects may be better explained in terms
of polarity alignment (Proctor and Cho, 2006), also called
markedness (Clark, 1969; Lakens, 2012; Lynott and Coventry,
2013). Like many other continuums in language and mind,
metaphoric “source domains” like height and “target domains”
like happiness tend to be marked, or bipolar. That is, they consist
of an unmarked or +polar endpoint (e.g., high, happy), and
an opposing marked or  polar endpoint (low, sad). Unmarked
endpoints (+polar) are commonly defined as the default, and
are generally broader or more evaluatively positive than marked
( polar) endpoints (Lehrer, 1985; Proctor and Cho, 2006; for a
critique see Haspelmath, 2006). The constructs of “polarity” and
“markedness” are generally discussed by different communities
of researchers, but these constructs are overlapping and may
be impossible to distinguish, even terminologically; like polarity
theorists (Proctor and Cho, 2006), markedness theorists typically
describe unmarked poles as “positive” and marked poles as
“negative” (Clark, 1973). Here we will use the terms “markedness”
and “polarity” interchangeably.
Themarkedness of continuums in language andmind can often
be traced to asymmetries in the body and world. Clark (1973)
explains how the specifics of human perceptual organs, and of
our habitat, give rise to the markedness of two spatial continuums
that serve as source domains for whole families of metaphors:
the up/down continuum and the front/back continuum. The
unmarked (+polar) poles of these continuums are those that we
can perceive more easily, whereas the marked ( polar) poles are
harder to perceive. Clark (1973) notes that “since everything above
ground level is perceptible and nothing below it is, upward is
naturally positive and downward is naturally negative” (p. 33).
Likewise, “the front of an object is the facet that contains the
perceptual apparatus, as in animals, whereas the back is that facet
which does not. The front is the direction toward which an animal
moves, and the back is the direction fromwhich an animal moves;
front is the positive direction, and back is the negative direction”
(ibid, p. 43). Clark argues that the markedness/polarity of these
spatial continuums gets extended to non-spatial domains that
people talk about using spatial metaphors in language, and by
hypothesis think about using schematic spatial representations
(e.g., domains like time, valence, and pitch).
Whether or not a perceptual basis for markedness is apparent,
the marked and unmarked ends of continuums can be identified
on the basis of patterns in language. The unmarked (+polar) term
often serves as the name of the entire continuum: people’s physical
stature is measured on a continuum of height, not of shortness.
Accordingly, the unmarked term can describe values along the
whole continuum: a flagpole can be “10 meters high,” but not “10
meters low” (see also Clark et al., 1973). Questions posed using
unmarked termmake no presupposition, whereas questions using
themarked term presuppose an answer in a restricted range of the
continuum. For example, “How tall is he?” does not presuppose
that a person is tall. The answer could be “He is average height” or
even “He is a midget.” By contrast, “How short is he?” presupposes
an answer on the short end of the continuum. Markedness also
constrains the order in which the two poles of a continuum tend
to be mentioned in verbal collocations. Turning to the front–back
continuum, Landsberg (1995) notes that “the front [is] the most
important, and hence we will always think—and speak—of “front
first,” using sequences like in front of-behind, before-after, to-
from, front–back, and shunning such serials as *behind-in front of,
*after-before, *from-to, *back-front, etc.” (p. 70, italics added).
There is abundant evidence that markedness/polarity
alignment can affect cognitive processing. Participants show
faster reaction times (RTs) for unmarked (+polar) dimensions
compared to marked ( polar) ones, and faster RTs when
poles are aligned than when they are misaligned (see Clark,
1969; Seymour, 1974; Proctor and Cho, 2006). In light of the
evidence for markedness effects, it is important to consider
whether RT benefits for congruent metaphoric source-target
pairings (like happy and up) could be explained by an additive
processing advantage for +polar endpoints (e.g., happy +polar,
up +polar)—without any need to invoke metaphor theory.
Does polarity alignment offer an alternative, non-metaphorical
explanation for metaphor congruity effects like those reported
by Meier and Robinson (2004), Schubert (2005), and many other
studies that rely on dimensional compatibility in binary speeded
response tasks (Lakens, 2012)? And if so, what would this mean
for theories of metaphorical mental representation?
Crucially, not all of the evidence for metaphoric thinking
comes from binary response-time congruity effects. A variety
of methods have been used, and studies show that people’s
metaphoric representations of domains like time and musical
pitch map onto space in a continuous analog fashion (Casasanto
andBoroditsky, 2008; Dolscheid et al., 2013). English speakers, for
instance, who talk about musical pitch in terms of spatial height
(e.g., “high” vs. “low”) also implicitly associate higher pitches with
higher positions in space in non-linguistic psychophysical tasks.
In one study, participants were asked to reproducemusical pitches
while watching lines that varied in spatial height. Lines of nine
different heights were fully crossed with nine different pitches.
Participants’ pitch reproductions were affected by this irrelevant
spatial information throughout the ranges of pitches and heights
presented. On average, the same tones were reproduced at the
lowest frequencies when they were accompanied by the lowest
lines, at the highest frequencies when they were accompanied by
a highest lines, and at intermediate frequencies when they were
accompanied by lines of intermediate spatial heights; these results
show a continuous linear relationship between spatial height and
pitch [Dolscheid et al., 2013; see Casasanto and Boroditsky (2008)
for an analogous result showing a continuous spatial mapping of
temporal duration]. In this study, responses were not speeded,
the dependent variable was not RT, and the metaphor-congruity
effects did not rely on the kind of binary stimulus-response
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compatibility that is believed to give rise to polarity alignment
effects (Proctor and Cho, 2006).
Further impetus to question whether markedness can account
for metaphor congruity effects comes from the fact that some
mappings between space and musical pitch appear to go against
markedness. Whereas speakers of many languages (including
English) refer to pitch in terms of spatial height, other languages
use different metaphors (e.g., Eitan and Timmers, 2010). Speakers
of Farsi or Turkish, for instance, describe pitch in terms of
spatial thickness (Shayan et al., 2011). These thickness-pitch
metaphors show reversed polarity alignment compared to height-
pitch metaphors. Thick (+polar) refers to a low frequency pitch
( polar), whereas thin ( polar) refers to a high frequency pitch
(+polar). Farsi speakers implicitly represent pitch in terms of
thickness, consistent with their verbalmetaphors (Dolscheid et al.,
2013); in this case, where markedness and metaphorical spatial
schemas are in opposition, spatial schemas predicted people’s
behavior, and markedness/polarity alignment did not.
Although experiments like Dolscheid et al.’s (2013) provide
evidence for metaphorical mental representation that cannot
be explained by markedness, the role of markedness in binary
compatibility tasks remains controversial. Do source-target
congruity effects merely show polarity alignment? Or do they
reveal metaphoric associations? Althoughmetaphors and polarity
are often indistinguishable in spatial compatibility tasks (see
Lakens, 2012), we predict that when markedness and metaphor
are juxtaposed, spatial congruity effects will support metaphoric
thinking, not markedness. What should primarily determine the
pattern of responses is whether the stimuli that participants have
to classify in binary compatibility tasks activate a metaphor-
appropriate spatial schema (e.g., in the case of space-pitch
mappings for English speakers, it should be a uni-dimensional
vertical spatial schema). That is, we propose that schema-
appropriateness should be necessary, and markedness should not
be sufficient, to produce congruity effects between metaphorical
source and target domains.
In Experiment 1, we tested compatibility between space and
pitch for two pairs of spatial terms, both of which describe
paradigm cases of marked spatial continuums (Clark, 1973). One
pair (high/low) corresponds to the poles of the correct vertical
spatial continuum, which English speakers use to think about
pitch, and the other pair (front/back) to the poles of an incorrect
spatial continuum, which is not used for pitch in English (or any
other known language). As explained above, “high” and “front”
both constitute the unmarked or+polar endpoint, whereas “low”
and “back” represent the marked or  polar endpoint of spatial
continuums (Clark, 1973; Landsberg, 1995). The markedness of
the pitch continuum has been questioned by some researchers,
and it is possible that its markedness varies across contexts (Eitan
and Timmers, 2010; Eitan, 2013). But if markedness is to explain
binary height-pitch compatibility effects that are predicted by
height-pitch metaphors in English, which have been reported
previously (e.g., Melara and Marks, 1990; Rusconi et al., 2006),
then the high-frequency pole of the pitch continuum must be
processed as unmarked (+polar), and the low-frequency pole
as marked ( polar)—at least in the context of spatial height.
Here participants were asked to make binary speeded judgments
on high-frequency and low-frequency pitches, classifying pitches
either in a polarity-congruent way (e.g., high pitches as “high”
or “front”), or in a polarity-incongruent way (e.g., high pitches
as “low” or “back”). If polarity alignment drives space-pitch
congruity effects, then similar effects should be found when pitch
is mapped to any marked linear spatial continuum, regardless
of its orientation: High/low and front/back should both produce
pitch-congruity effects. Alternatively, if activating a particular
spatial schema for pitch is critical (i.e., the schema that is encoded
in verbal metaphors the participants’ language), then high/low
should result in a congruity effect, but front/back should not.
EXPERIMENT 1
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-four English speakers with no reported hearing problems
participated for payment (5$ per 30 min). Four participants were
excluded from analyses for not following instructions (i.e., they
responded according to the wrong response mapping throughout
at least one task). They were replaced by a new sample of 4
participants who had not previously participated in the task. This
study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations
of New School for Social Research (NSSR) Institutional Review
Board (IRB) with written informed consent from all subjects. All
subjects gave written informed consent in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki.
Materials and Procedure
Participants performed two tasks: categorizing pitches as high
vs. low (high/low task) or as front vs. back (front/back task).
In both tasks participants heard tones, one at a time, and were
asked to categorize each tone as quickly and accurately as possible
by pressing buttons on the QWERTY keyboard (Q and P keys).
Stimuli were presented on an Apple iMac using Vision Egg
2.6 (Straw, 2008). Tones were generated by Audacity software1
and comprised two pure tones (low frequency tone: 262; high
frequency tone: 440 hertz). Each tone lasted 400 ms. Tones were
presented at approximately 60 dB-a. At this amplitude, standard
equal loudness curves suggest the perceived loudness of our
high and low pitches should be nearly identical. Differences in
subjective loudness levels between the two tones, therefore, are
unlikely to account for any observed congruity effects.
Participants listened to tones via sealed headphones
(Sennheiser HD201). Immediately following the offset of
each tone, two response options (e.g., high, low) appeared, one on
the bottom left and the other on the bottom right of the screen.
Participants were instructed to classify the sound by pressing
the button located under the corresponding word (e.g., high or
low) as fast and accurately as possible. The left–right locations
of the spatial terms varied randomly from trial to trial so that
participants could not predict the location of the correct word in
advance, and so that there was no association between left–right
space and pitch or spatial height.
Tasks (high/low and front/back) were presented in 2 blocks.
Within each block, spatial terms were crossed with pitches
1http://audacity.sourceforge.net/
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to create 2 different space-pitch pairings (e.g., Congruent:
categorizing high-frequency pitches as “high”; Incongruent:
categorizing high-frequency pitches as “low”). The order of task
blocks was counterbalanced across participants. The congruent
and incongruent trials were also presented in blocks, with the
order of congruity blocks counterbalanced within each task
block. Across task blocks, incongruent and congruent conditions
were always presented in alternation. Before each condition,
participants received 6 practice trials with feedback. Participants
were also given an example illustrating the appropriate space-pitch
pairing before the practice trials.
Each condition consisted of 24 trials, yielding 48 trials per
task and 96 trials in total for each participant. For half of the
trials a high pitch was presented, for the other half a low pitch
was presented, in each condition. The order of high and low
pitches was randomized. In the high–low congruent condition,
the high pitch had to be categorized as high and the low pitch
as low. In the high–low incongruent condition, the high pitch
had to be categorized as low and the low pitch as high. In
the front–back congruent condition the high pitch had to be
categorized as front and the low pitch as back (according to
patterns of polarity/markedness). In the front–back incongruent
condition the low pitch had to be categorized as front and the
high pitch as back. Participants’ responses immediately initiated
the next trial.
Results
All data were analyzed using R (version 2.14.2)2 and the R
packages lme4 (Bates andMaechler, 2009) and languageR (Baayen,
2007; cf. Baayen, 2008). We carried out linear mixed effects
regression models of Space (high–low versus front–back) and
Congruity (congruent, incongruent) on accuracy and RTs. Using
the principle of backward selection, we started out with a full
(conservative) model which took into consideration not only the
random intercept but also the random slopes of subject whenever
it was appropriate (i.e., when the factor was a within-subject
factor). Random intercepts and slopes of items were not included
in the analysis due to the small number of items (4 words:
high/low, front/back). To interpret the significance, we adopted
the criterion that a given cosine was significant if the absolute
value of the t-statistic (or z-statistic) exceeded 2 (Baayen, 2008).
Accuracy
The mean accuracy for all target trials was 92.4% (SD = 8.1). For
the high/low task, accuracy was 92.4% (SD = 9.7), and for the
front/back task, accuracy was 92.5% (SD = 11.3). For congruent
conditions, accuracy was 95.9% (SD = 4.5) and for incongruent
conditions it was 88.9% (SD= 15.5). Analyzing accuracy by using
a logistic mixed effects model on binary accuracy data yielded no
main effects or interaction of Space (high/low, front/back) and
Congruity (congruent, incongruent), (Space: z= |1.3|; Congruity:
z = |0.2|; Space by Congruity: z = |1.2|).
Reaction times
Reaction times of the button presseswere analyzed by linearmixed
effects models. Only correct trials were analyzed which resulted in
2http://www.r-project.org/
FIGURE 1 | Experiment 1 results. The influence of Space (high–low;
front–back) and Congruity (congruent; incongruent) on pitch categorization
(plotted in milliseconds). A significant congruity effect was found in the
high–low task (left) but not in the front–back task (right). Error bars indicate the
SEM.
the exclusion of 7% of the data. Responses greater or less than 2
SDs away from each participant’s average RTs were also excluded,
which resulted in the removal of 6% of the accurate trials.
Of primary interest, there was significant interaction of
Congruity by Space (t = |3.3|). This interaction comprised a
significant effect of Congruity in the high/low task (t = |4.5|), but
not in the front–back task (t = |0.2|; Figure 1). There was also
a significant main effect of Congruity (t = |3.5|), but this effect
was not of interest for discriminating between the “metaphor” and
“markedness/polarity-correspondence” hypotheses.
Discussion
In Experiment 1 we find congruity effects for the high/low but not
for the front/back task, suggesting that activating the appropriate
spatial schema (i.e., spatial height) is what is relevant in such
binary response compatibility tasks.Words that activate a different
(irrelevant) spatial schema (front–back), however, do not result
in a congruity effect. This finding indicates that congruity effects
cannot be attributed to markedness (polarity alignment), since
“front” and “back” also name the unmarked and marked ends of
a (sagittally oriented) linear spatial continuum.
EXPERIMENT 2
Whereas high/low terminology is conventional for pitch in
English, front/back is not. Maybe we only found a congruity
effect for high/low in Experiment 1 because this space-pitch
mapping is lexicalized, whereas front/back is not? This skeptical
interpretation of the results would not change the fact that
markedness was not sufficient to elicit congruity effects, but it
would call into question our claim about activating the right
spatial schema. Do we find congruity effects only because
participants were using the polysemous words high/low, which
can refer to “height” in both space and pitch?
To rule out this explanation, in Experiment 2 we compared
congruity effects for two pairs of spatial terms: tall/short and
big/small. Neither pair of spatial expressions can be used in
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conventional English to describe the height of musical pitches
(i.e., their frequency). If high/low congruity effects were driven
by polysemy, then neither of these pairs of spatial terms should
produce a congruity effect. However, if space-pitch congruity
effects result from using words that activate a vertical spatial
schema, then “tall” and “short” should produce a congruity
effect because they are schematically appropriate (even though
they are lexically inappropriate). By contrast, “big” and “small”
should not produce any space-pitch congruity effect, because
these terms refer to 3-dimensional size, and should not activate
the appropriate 1-dimensional vertical spatial schema (Dirven and
Taylor, 1988; Taylor, 2002).
In addition to testing whether the height-pitch congruity effect
in Experiment 1 depended on the polysemy of “high” and “low,”
Experiment 2 also provides a second test of the sufficiency of
markedness to produce space-pitch congruity effects. “Big” is the
unmarked (+polar) end and “small” the marked ( polar) end
of the big-small spatial continuum. Therefore, assuming that the
high-frequency and low-frequency poles of the pitch continuum
are the unmarked poles, respectively, then markedness/polarity
correspondence makes a clear prediction: judgments should be
faster when “big” is matched with “high” than when “small” is
matched with “high.” This is not the only possible prediction
that can from markedness, however. Eitan (2013) and Eitan and
Timmers (2010) have proposed that the markedness of pitch
may be context dependent: perhaps, in the context of big vs.
small space, the markedness of the high- and low-frequency
poles reverse. Whether or not one agrees with this proposal,
it is important to note that it makes an alternative prediction:
on a “reversed-markedness” account, judgments in our big/small
task should be faster when “small” is matched with “high” than
when “big” is matched with “high.” Both of these markedness-
based predictions contrast with the prediction that follows from
the vertical space-pitch metaphors in English: we should find a
significant congruity effect for the word pair that activates a uni-
dimensional vertical spatial schema (tall/short), but no significant
effect (or a significantly weaker effect) for the word pair that
activates a different spatial schema (big/small).
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-four English speakers who did not participate in
Experiment 1, and who had no reported hearing problems
participated for payment (5$ per 30 min). One participant
was excluded from analyses for not following instructions (i.e.,
the participant responded according to the wrong response
mapping throughout one condition). He was replaced by a new
participant. This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of NSSR IRB with written informed consent
from all subjects. All subjects gave written informed consent in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Materials and Procedure
The same procedure as in Experiment 1 was used, with the
following exceptions. Rather than classifying pitches as high–low
or front–back, participants classified them as tall-short for one
block and big-small for the other.
For the tall-short task, the high pitch had to be categorized
as tall and the low pitch as short in the congruent condition,
whereas the low pitch had to be categorized as tall and the
high pitch as short in the incongruent condition. For the big-
small task, we coded markedness according to the standard
assumption that the high-frequency pole of the pitch continuum
is unmarked: thus, in the condition we labeled as “congruent”
the high pitch had to be categorized as big and the low pitch
as small, whereas in the condition we labeled as “incongruent”
the low pitch had to be categorized as big and the high pitch
as small. Importantly, the decision to code congruity in this
way did not affect our ability to detect space-pitch compatibility
effects. According to this coding, an RT advantage for pairing
high pitches with “big” would be consistent with standard
assumption that high-frequency pole is unmarked end of the pitch
continuum; alternatively, an RT advantage for pairing high pitches
with “small” would be consistent with Eitan and colleagues’
suggestion that the markedness of pitch reverses in the context
of spatial size. Either size-pitch congruity effect, therefore, would
be consistent with a markedness-based prediction, and at odds
with the prediction that follows from vertical spatial metaphors
in English.
Results
We carried out linear mixed effects regression models of
Space (tall-short versus big-small) and Congruity (congruent,
incongruent) on accuracy and RTs, as in Experiment 1. Using
the principle of backward selection, we again started out with
a full (conservative) model which took into consideration not
only the random intercept but also the random slopes of subject
whenever it was appropriate (i.e., when the factor was a within-
subject factor). Random intercepts and slopes of items were not
included in the analysis due to the small number of items (4words:
tall/short, big/small). To interpret the significance, we adopted the
criterion that a given cosine was significant if the absolute value of
the t-statistic (or z-statistic) exceeded 2 (Baayen, 2008).
Accuracy
The mean accuracy for all target trials was 94.8% (SD = 11.4).
For the tall/short task, accuracy was 94.6% (SD = 13.1), and
for the big/small task, accuracy was 94.9% (SD = 10.1). For
congruent conditions, accuracy was 96.2% (SD = 6.7) and for
incongruent conditions it was 93.3% (SD = 17.1). Analyzing
accuracy by using a logistic mixed effects model on binary
accuracy data yielded no main effects or interaction of Space
(tall/short, big/small) and Congruity (congruent, incongruent),
(Space: z = |1.0|; Congruency: z = |1.0|; Space by Congruity:
z = |1.0|).
Reaction Times
Reaction times of the button presses were analyzed by linear
mixed effects models. Only correct trials were considered which
resulted in the exclusion of 4% of the data. Responses greater or
less than  2 SDs away from each participant’s average RTs were
also excluded, which resulted in the removal of 4% of the accurate
trials.
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FIGURE 2 | Experiment 2 results. The influence of Space (tall–short;
big–small) and Congruity (congruent; incongruent) on pitch categorization
(plotted in milliseconds). A significant congruity effect was found in the
tall–short task (left) but not in the big-small task (right). Error bars indicate
the SEM.
Of primary interest, there was a significant interaction of
Congruity by Space (t = |3.2|). This interaction comprised a
significant effect of Congruity in the tall/short task (t = |3.0|), but
not in the big/small task (t = |1.5|; Figure 2).
Discussion
In Experiment 2 we found a congruity effect in the tall/short
task but not in big/small task. Therefore, the vertical space-
pitch congruity effects found in Experiments 1 and 2 cannot be
attributed to polysemy (since “tall” and “short” do not denote
pitch in English), nor to markedness (since there were no
effects of alignment between the poles of the high/low frequency
continuum and the big/small spatial continuum). Rather, space-
pitch congruity effects resulted from activating the appropriate
spatial schema, which serves as ametaphorical scaffold for English
speakers’ mental representations of musical pitch.
Results of the big/small task in Experiment 2 both corroborated
and complemented those of the front/back task in Experiment 1.
Front/back is a marked linear spatial continuum, like high/low,
but these continuums are anchored by different minimum values
or “zero points”; whereas the zero point for high/low is at the
negative (marked) pole, the zero point for front/back is mid-way
between the negative (marked) and positive (unmarked) poles.
We have no reason to believe that pitch cannot be mapped to a
spatial continuum that is anchored in the middle (in fact, there
is evidence that some musicians spatialize pitch on a left–right
continuum; Rusconi et al., 2006). In principle, however, the
difference in 0 points between the spatial continuums tested in
Experiment 1 could account for the observed pattern of positive
and null results. Yet, this skeptical possibility is ruled out by
the results of Experiment 2; like the high/low continuum, the
big/small continuum is anchored by a 0 point at the negative pole.
Two aspects of the design of Experiment 2 bear careful
consideration. First, as discussed in Section Materials and
Methods, not all researchers agree on which pole of the
pitch continuum is marked in the context of spatial size
(Eitan and Timmers, 2010; Eitan, 2013). Does this ambiguity
create a methodological problem for the present experiment?
No. According to our experimental hypothesis verticality, not
markedness, is the “active ingredient” in the dominant space-
pitch mapping in English speakers’ minds. According to the
alternative hypothesis, markedness is the active ingredient in
mappings between space and non-spatial domains. The possibility
that either the high-frequency or the low-frequency end of the
pitch continuum is marked in the context of spatial size meant
that, in our big/small task, there were two possible congruity
effects that could be interpreted as support for a markedness-
based account—stacking the deck in favor of the markedness
hypothesis. Yet, even so, neither of these patterns was found. As in
Experiment 1, a space-pitch congruity effect was only foundwhere
it was predicted by vertical space-pitch metaphors in English.
Second, we note that although we found no significant size-
pitch congruity effects here, relationships between size and pitch
have been reported previously (e.g., Evans and Treisman, 2010). It
is clear that, at least under some circumstances, English speakers
may implicitly associate larger sizes with lower pitches. However,
on the basis of our previous research, we would predict that all
else being equal, the height-pitch mapping should be stronger or
more automatically activated in English speakers’ minds than the
size-pitch mapping (if the latter is found, at all).
As an alternative to height-pitch metaphors, some languages
have conventional size-pitchmetaphors, and other languages have
thickness-pitch metaphors (Eitan and Timmers, 2010; Shayan
et al., 2011). Thickness is one measure of multidimensional
spatial size. A thickness-pitch mapping is, therefore, similar to
a size-pitch mapping; in the limit, size-pitch and thickness-
pitch expressions in language could correspond to the same 3-
dimensional spatial schema scaffolding pitch representations. We
have found previously that 4-month old infants are sensitive
both to the height-pitch mapping that is encoded in linguistic
metaphors in English and to the thickness-pitch mapping that is
encoded in other languages like Farsi (Dolscheid et al., 2014). By
adulthood, however, our experiments show that only one of these
mappings is evident in people’s non-linguistic pitch judgments.
Dutch speakers’ pitch estimates were influenced significantly
by irrelevant spatial height information, but not by irrelevant
size/thickness information. Conversely, Farsi speakers’ pitch
estimateswere influenced significantly by irrelevant size/thickness
information, but not by irrelevant spatial height (Dolscheid et al.,
2013).
How could infants who are sensitive to both height-pitch and
size/thickness-pitch mappings turn into adults who preferentially
activate only one of these mappings when they represent
pitch? This process can be understood in terms of hierarchical
mental metaphors theory (HMMT; Casasanto and Bottini, 2014b).
According to this proposal, the implicit, non-linguistic source
domain-target domain mappings (a.k.a. mental metaphors) that
people tend to use most often are specific members of a
more general family of source domain-target domain mappings.
Development of mental metaphors appears to occur over a
two-stage process. First, in the case of space and pitch, a
superordinate “family” of mappings is established that includes
the height-pitch and size/thickness-pitch mappings (it remains an
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open question whether size-pitch and thickness-pitch mappings
are best considered to be “siblings” or one and the same).
These mappings may be constructed on the basis of observable
correlations between space and pitch in the natural world, over
ontogenetic or phylogenetic time. The height-pitch mapping
reflects the fact that people involuntarily raise their larynxes,
chins, and sometimes other body parts (e.g., eyebrows) when
they produce higher pitches, and lower them when they produce
lower pitches (Miller, 1986). The size/thickness mapping reflects
a pervasive correlation between pitches and the size of the objects
or creatures that produce them: consider the different ranges of
pitches produced by thin vs. thick strings on a guitar; big vs. small
drums; large vs. small animals; etc. Data from infants suggests not
only that height-pitch and size/thickness-pitch mappings are both
present pre-linguistically, but also that the mappings are about
equally strong; Dolscheid et al. (2014) found no difference in the
strength of the looking-time congruity effects for height-pitch vs.
size/thickness-pitch stimuli.
When children learn metaphors in language, a second process
begins. Our findings in adults suggest that each time people
use a linguistic metaphor like “a high pitch” they activate the
corresponding mental metaphor, strengthening this mapping at
the expense of competing mappings in the same “family” of
space-pitch associations. As a consequence, speakers of “height
languages” like Dutch and English come to rely on vertical spatial
schemas to scaffold their pitch representations more strongly
than multidimensional spatial schemas, whereas speakers of
“thickness languages” like Farsi come to rely on multidimensional
spatial schemas, more strongly than vertical spatial schemas
(Dolscheid et al., 2013). According to HMMT, the process
of strengthening certain mental metaphors via the use of the
corresponding linguistic metaphors results in the weakening of
other members of the family of mappings—but does not cause
these dispreferred mappings to be extinguished. Consistent with
this suggestion, Dolscheid et al. (2013) showed that Dutch
speakers could be induced to use a non-linguistic thickness-
pitch mapping (like Farsi speakers) after only a brief training
intervention.
Together, Dolscheid et al. (2013) experiments in infants
and adults suggest that speakers of a “height language” like
English may possess a mental metaphor linking pitch with
size/thickness, but that this mapping should be substantially
weaker than thementalmetaphor linking pitchwith height, which
gets strengthened through the use of conventional height-pitch
metaphors in English. It should be unsurprising, then, that size-
pitch mappings should be found in some task contexts but not
in others (see Dolscheid et al., 2013), and that in the present
experiment we found a significant height-pitch congruity effect
but no significant size-pitch congruity effect, despite the fact that
the height-pitch and size-pitch tasks were otherwise matched and
equipotent.
Importantly, for the purposes of the present study, the
possibility of a weak or latent metaphorical mapping between
size and pitch in English speakers’ minds worked against our
prediction that congruity effects should be found when pitch
was crossed with vertical space but not with sagittal space or
3-dimensional size.
EXPERIMENT 3
For Experiment 3 we did not collect any new behavioral data.
Instead, we submitted the results of the high/low and tall/short
task from Experiments 1 and 2 to further analysis, adapting
a method Lakens (2012) proposed to discriminate between
metaphor theory and polarity correspondence. Although these
analyses use some of the data from Experiments 1 and 2,
they take a different approach to testing our main claim: that
the space-pitch congruity effects are driven by metaphorical
mental representation, not by markedness/polarity alignment.
Our approach in Experiments 1 and 2 was to contrast pitch
congruity effects in tasks involving uni-dimensional vertical
spatial continuums (i.e., high/low and tall/short) with the lack
of congruity effects in tasks involving other marked spatial
continuums (i.e., front/back and big/small). Our strategy in
Experiment 3 is to probe the details of the vertical space-
pitch congruity effects we found to determine whether they
are uniquely consistent with metaphor theory, or whether
they are consistent with markedness/polarity alignment,
as well.
In many cases, metaphor theory and markedness/polarity
correspondence make overlapping predictions. In the present
experiments, metaphor theory and polarity correspondencemade
contrasting predictions for the front/back and big/small tasks, but
both theories predicted that high pitches should be congruent
with high/tall, and low pitches with low/short. In the analyses
we have presented so far, the results of the high/low and
tall/short tasks appear equally consistent with metaphor and with
markedness/polarity alignment. Yet, further analyses of these
results could constrain how these results bear on the two theories
that we seek to disentangle.
Lakens (2012) reasoned that, in speeded binary compatibility
tasks, both metaphor theory and polarity correspondence predict
a statistical interaction between polar continuums like vertical
space and pitch, but that the details of the interaction can
discriminate between the theories. Specifically, he reasoned that
althoughmetaphor and polarity correspondence make similar RT
predictions for three of the four cells in a 2 2 design (e.g., Space:
high, low; Pitch: high, low; see Figure 3 for an overview), they
make different predictions in a fourth cell, which is therefore of
critical importance (Figure 3,b). Theories of markedness/polarity
predict that, relative to the other conditions, RTs should be slow
when participants classify stimuli at the  polar ends of both
continuums (i.e., low pitch, low space): despite the fact that the
poles are aligned in this condition, negative polarity stimuli are
predicted to be processed more slowly than positive polarity
stimuli (Clark, 1969). By contrast, Lakens reasoned that according
to metaphor theory responses in this cell should be relatively
fast since low pitch and low space are metaphorically congruent.
On the basis of this reasoning, previous studies have interpreted
results that show no congruity effects in the negative polarity
conditions to be evidence for polarity correspondence and against
metaphor theory (Lakens, 2012; Lynott and Coventry, 2013).
Yet, this reasoning is faulty where it concerns metaphor theory,
as Lakens has subsequently acknowledged (Santiago and Lakens,
2015). On tasks like we report here, the only prediction that
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FIGURE 3 | Response time predictions of polarity correspondence vs.
metaphor accounts, according to Lakens (2012).
can be derived from metaphor theory is that there should be a
2-way interaction between the two levels of the source domain
(e.g., height) and of the target domain (e.g., pitch). The details
of this interaction cannot be predicted a priori—at least not on
the basis of metaphor theory—and are likely to vary according
to idiosyncrasies of the stimuli, task, participants, etc. The same
critical interaction could be found with or without any significant
main effects (e.g., with or without a main effect of spatial height
or of pitch height), and with varying collections of significant or
non-significant simple effects in the four pairwise comparisons
between cells. In our high/low and tall/short tasks, any pattern
of main effects and simple effects would support metaphor theory
so long as the 2  2 interaction was significant and in the
predicted direction (i.e., overall, metaphor-congruent responses
must be faster than metaphor-incongruent responses). In short,
the analysis method that Lakens (2012) proposed cannot be used
to disconfirm the predictions of metaphor theory.
We agree, however, that Lakens (2012) analysis
method can be used to disconfirm predictions of polarity
correspondence/markedness. We conducted two sets of analyses
in order to determine whether the high/low and tall/short
congruity effects reported in Experiment 1 and 2 were compatible
with a markedness/polarity correspondence account. Whereas
metaphor theory makes no predictions about the details of
these congruity effects, polarity correspondence predicts that
congruity effects should be weakest in the  polar conditions
(Lakens, 2012; Lynott and Coventry, 2013). Therefore, in the
analyses below, if congruity effects are significantly weaker
in the –polar conditions than in the +polar conditions, this
outcome would be consistent with both metaphor theory
and with markedness/polarity correspondence. By contrast, if
congruity effects do not differ between the –polar conditions
and +polar conditions, this outcome would still be consistent
with metaphor theory, but would disconfirm the predictions of
markedness/polarity correspondence.
Methods and Results
Significant metaphor-congruity effects were already reported in
Experiments 1 and 2, for both the high/low and tall/short tasks,
FIGURE 4 | Response time patterns of high–low congruity effects. The
influence of Congruity (congruent; incongruent) on pitch categorization for
high pitches vs. low pitches (plotted in milliseconds). Error bars indicate the
SEM.
FIGURE 5 | Response time patterns of tall-short congruity effects. The
influence of Congruity (congruent; incongruent) on pitch categorization for
high pitches vs. low pitches (plotted in milliseconds). Error bars indicate the
SEM.
respectively. Here we examined the details of these effects, testing
whether the space-pitch congruity effects were significant for
the low-pitch trials ( polar) and the high-pitch trials (+polar),
considered separately, and critically, whether the magnitudes of
the congruity effects differed between low- and high-pitch trials.
High/Low Task (Experiment 1)
First, a linear mixed effects regression of Congruity on RTs
restricted to high pitches was conducted. Results showed a
significant effect of Congruity (t = |4.7|; Figure 4, right). Next,
the regression model was restricted to low pitches, and this model
also revealed a significant effect of Congruity (t = |4.0|). That
is, participants were faster to classify low pitches (–polar) as low
(–polar) than to classify low pitches as high (Figure 4, left). The
magnitude of these congruity effects did not differ significantly
(t = |0.1|); that it, the observed space-pitch congruity effect was
no stronger for high-pitch (+polar) trials than for the low-pitch
( polar) trials. This result is compatible with metaphor theory,
but incompatible with the predictions of polarity alignment.
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Tall/Short Task (Experiment 2)
Analogous analyses were conducted for tall-short congruity
effects of Experiment 2. Results showed a significant effect of
Congruity (t = |3.0|; Figure 5, right) when high pitches had to
be classified (+polar trials) but there was only a trend in the
predicted direction when low pitches had to be classified ( polar
trials; t = |1.2|; Figure 5, left). Critically, however, the magnitude
of the effect in low pitch trials did not differ significantly from
the effect found in high pitch trials (t = |1.4|). Again, this result
is compatible with metaphor theory, but incompatible with the
predictions of polarity alignment.
Discussion
Significant metaphor-congruity effects were reported in
Experiments 1 and 2. Metaphor theory licenses no predictions
about the details of these effects, but polarity correspondence
makes a clear prediction: congruity effects should be weakest
in the –polar conditions (Lakens, 2012; Lynott and Coventry,
2013). Yet, this prediction was not upheld. In Experiment 1 the
space-pitch congruity effect was highly significant for the low-
pitch trials, and the magnitude of this effect did not differ from
magnitude of the effect found in high-pitch trials. In Experiment
2 the space-pitch congruity effect only trended in the predicted
direction for the low-pitch trials, but the magnitude of this effect
did not differ significantly from the significant effect found in
high pitch trials.
In principle, metaphor-congruity effects and polarity-
alignment effects could co-occur, and their effects could
combine. This combination would result in a strengthening of the
metaphor congruity effects for the+polar trials, and a weakening
of the metaphor congruity effects for –polar trials. Yet, no such
pattern was found; there was no significant difference in strength
between the +polar and  polar trials, in either the high/low or
tall/short tasks.
Together, these analyses suggest that the high/low and
tall/short congruity effects we found in Experiments 1 and 2
are not equally compatible with metaphor theory and polarity
correspondence, even though both theories predicted the
observed 2-way interactions of space and pitch. Upon examining
the details of these interactions, we see that the results both
confirm the predictions of metaphor theory and disconfirm the
predictions of markedness/polarity correspondence. Since this
was also the case for the results of the front/back and big/small
tasks, we can conclude that overall, all four tasks of Experiments
1 and 2 are compatible with metaphor theory and incompatible
with markedness/polarity correspondence.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In three experiments, we examined relationships between space
and musical pitch in binary response-time congruity tasks. We
tested whether space-pitch congruity effects were best explained
in terms of metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) or
polarity correspondence (a.k.a. markedness; Clark, 1969; Proctor
and Cho, 2006). Classifying pitches with vertical spatial words
(high vs. low; tall vs. short) elicited space-pitch congruity
effects, but no comparable effects were found when participants
were asked to classify pitches with words that name the poles
of other marked spatial continuums (front vs. back; big vs.
small). Polarity correspondence, alone, did not produce space-
pitch congruity effects. Congruity effects emerged only when
participants activated the vertical spatial schema encoded in
space-pitch metaphors in English.
In many cases, the polarities of metaphorical source and target
domains are aligned (Lakens, 2012). The unmarked ends of target
domains like happiness, power, and pitch are all metaphorically
UP (i.e., the unmarked end of this spatial continuum), whereas
the marked ends of these continuums are metaphorically DOWN
(i.e., the marked end of the spatial continuum). Therefore, in
principle, congruity effects like those we found in our high/low
and tall/short tasks could be equally consistent with metaphor
theory andwithmarkedness/polarity correspondence. Yet, further
analyses showed that these congruity effects were only consistent
with predictions of metaphor theory; they were inconsistent with
the predictions of polarity correspondence.
Polarity correspondence predicted that the high/low and
tall/short congruity effects should be weakest in the –polar
conditions, but this was not the case. There was no significant
difference in the strength of the congruity effects found in the
–polar vs. +polar conditions in either the high/low or tall/short
tasks, and the congruity effect in the –polar condition was highly
significant in the high/low task. Together, these results show
thatmarkedness/polarity correspondence is neither necessary nor
sufficient to produce the kind of binary response compatibility
effects we found here, whichwere predicted on the basis of vertical
space-pitch metaphors in English.
In our experiments the spatial source domain was not
manipulated physically but rather via linguistic stimuli (see
Dolscheid et al., 2013, for corroborating results from a non-
linguistic task). Importantly, congruity effects were not restricted
to polysemous words like “high” and “low,” which can be used for
both space and pitch. Rather, congruity effects were also found
for the words “tall” and “short,” which have no musical senses.
Finding a significant space-pitch congruity effect in the tall/short
task argues against a skeptical interpretation of the non-significant
effects in the front/back and big/small tasks: it was not necessary
for the stimulus words to be used conventionally to talk about
pitch in English—the congruity effects did not depend on overlap
in conventional words for space and pitch. Rather, it was both
necessary and sufficient for participants to activate a vertical
spatial schema.
Could congruity effects in tall/short tasks still be driven by
polysemy indirectly? Could participants in the tall/short task have
activated the words “high” and “low” covertly when classifying
pitches, via semantic priming? This explanation is unlikely to
account for our results, for several reasons. According to Latent
Semantic Analysis (LSA)3, “tall” is more strongly related to
“short” (LSA cosine: 0.48) than to “high” (LSA cosine: 0.31),
and “short” is about equally strongly related to “high” (LSA
cosine: 0.30) as to “low” (LSA cosine: 0.31). Since activation
is expected to spread between the most strongly related items
3http://lsa.colorado.edu/
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(Collins and Loftus, 1975), simple spreading activation would
have wiped out a tall-short congruity effect rather than producing
it.
Further evidence against an explanation of our findings based
on semantic priming comes from the fact that “big” is more
closely related to “high” than to “low” (LSA cosine: 0.18 versus
0.12), yet there was no congruity effect in the big/small task. The
non-significant big/small effect trends in the opposite direction
from this pattern of semantic associations (see Figure 2). To
summarize these points, the LSA semantic distances between
tall/short and high/low are not aligned in a way that should
produce the predicted congruity effect, and yet a significant effect
was found. By contrast, the semantic distances between big/small
and high/low are aligned in a way that could produce a congruity
effect via semantic priming from the stimulus words to the
conventional space-pitch terms in English, and yet no such effect
was found. This pattern argues strongly against an explanation of
our tall/short congruity effect based on semantic priming of the
words “high” and “low.”
Our results converge with those of a study showing space-
time and space-number congruity effects that could not be
explained by polarity correspondence (Santiago and Lakens,
2015). Markedness/polarity correspondence effects are well
established (Clark, 1969; Proctor and Cho, 2006), but they cannot
necessarily explain away metaphor congruity effects like those
we present here. Papers attempting to challenge metaphor theory
on the basis of polarity correspondence raise an important
concern: “metaphor congruity effects” should not be interpreted
as support for metaphor theory, unequivocally, if the data can
be explained equally well in terms of another theory, such as
polarity correspondence (Lakens, 2012; Lynott and Coventry,
2013). Yet, the conclusions of these papers should be reconsidered:
the method Lakens (2012) proposed is not, in fact, capable
of disconfirming the predictions of metaphor theory. It is,
however, capable of disconfirming the predictions of polarity
correspondence, as it did in the present study.
Our findings, which cannot be explained in terms of
markedness/polarity correspondence, corroborate previous
studies suggesting that people not only talk about musical pitch
metaphorically but also think about it metaphorically, activating
the particular kind of spatial representation that is encoded
in their linguistic metaphors (Rusconi et al., 2006; Evans and
Treisman, 2010; Walker et al., 2010; Dolscheid et al., 2013).
CONCLUSION
Metaphor-congruity effects have been challenged by a
markedness, or polarity-correspondence-based account, claiming
that binary response compatibility effects may be better explained
by markedness than by metaphorical thinking (Lakens, 2012;
Lynott and Coventry, 2013). In binary compatibility experiments,
metaphor and polarity are often hard to distinguish. Yet, here
we show that when metaphor and polarity are juxtaposed,
the congruity effects support metaphorical thinking, not
markedness/polarity correspondence.
Furthermore, these results show that it is not necessary to use
polysemous words to produce source-target congruity effects (i.e.,
words that can refer to both the metaphorical source and target
domains, such as space and pitch). Words that activate a vertical
schema (e.g., tall/short) produce a space-pitch congruity effect
despite being lexically inappropriate to describe pitch. Words
that activate other spatial schemas (e.g., front/back, big/small)
do not produce any space-pitch congruity effect, despite naming
the poles of other marked spatial continuums. Together, these
results indicate that activating the appropriate spatial schema
is the “active ingredient” in space-pitch congruity effects—not
polysemy, or markedness/polarity correspondence—supporting
theories of metaphorical mental representation.
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